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ABSTRACT Prior studies have shown that the behaviours and attitudes of Internet users influence the
likelihood of being victimised by phishing attacks. Many scammers design a step-by-step approach to
phishing in order to gain the potential victim’s trust and convince them to take the desired actions. It is
important to understand which behaviours and attitudes can influence following the attacker in each step of
a phishing scam. This will enable us to identify the root causes of phishing and to develop specific mitigation
plans for each step of the phishing process and to increase prevention points. This study investigates to what
extent people’s risk-taking and decision-making styles influence the likelihood of phishing victimisation
in three specific phishing steps. We asked participants to play a risk-taking game and to answer questions
related to two psychological scales to measure their behaviours, and then conducted a simulated phishing
campaign to assess their phishability throughout the three phishing steps selected. We find that the attitude to
risk-taking and gender can predict users’ phishability in the different steps selected. There are however other
possible direct and indirect behavioural factors that could be investigated in future studies. The results of
this study and the model developed can be used to build a comprehensive framework to prevent the success
of phishing attempts, starting from their root causes.
INDEX TERMS Cyber security, phishing, human behaviour, individual differences, online scams.
I. INTRODUCTION
The digital world has increasingly become, for many of us,
another ‘real’ world at the same level as the physical world
that we inhabit. People do business on the Internet, share
their knowledge and study online, make electronic bank and
payments transfers, trade cryptocurrency, and carry out a
range of other activities that used to only be possible in the
physical world. The digital world is making our lives much
easier by increasing the speed of communication, decreasing
our travels, etc. But at the same time, this shift is causing a
set of new challenges and potential problems. While many
Internet attackers use technical methods such as exploiting
vulnerabilities inherent in the design of applications and/or
network security flaws to gain unauthorised access to the
victims’ sensitive and critical data, others use psychological
tricks to fool people and gain their confidence, similarly
to what scammers do in the physical world. Scams have
existed since long before computers and the Internet, and they
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and
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are unlikely to disappear, as scammers adapt and find new
ways of fooling us. Phishing, which is a social engineering
attack, is like other scams. Phishers use technical, social,
and/or people’s psychological vulnerabilities to acquire a
victims’ sensitive information [1] and use that information
to steal their financial assets or launch other attacks, such as
ICS (Industrial Control System) attacks [2], Smart Airports
Attacks [3], etc.
Phishing usually starts with a scam email that is designed
to lure a victim. Attackers send out millions of these scam
emails every day, but not all of the phishing attempts end
up successful [4], [5]. There are several technical solutions
to block phishing emails before they are delivered to the
users’ email inbox. However, these solutions do not detect
and prevent all phishing emails [6], [7], so it is the user’s job
to determine what email in the inbox is phishing and what is
legitimate. This study focuses on the user’s role in detecting
and preventing phishing.
Previous studies [8], [9] showed that a scammer might use
human cognitive and behavioural attributes to design their
tricks and to fool victims. For instance, a scammermay send a
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FIGURE 1. A common phishing attack process.
fake email that appears to come from a legitimate source and
use the behavioural weaknesses of the victim to build trust.
They can, for example, ask the recipient to click on a web link
to win a prize. Some people’s high risk-taking attitudes or a
desire to gamble mean that they will click on the link, which
opens a phishing website. Some of them might then decide
to enter sensitive information on the webpage. As we go on
to show in this paper, scammer uses psychological tricks to
trap their victims. However, as of yet, little is known about
which risk-taking behaviour and decision-making style1 cre-
ates psychological vulnerabilities and how these are exploited
in the different steps of the phishing process.
As presented in Figure 1, an attacker sends a phishing email
to a user. The email might contain a phishing link or attach-
ment (or both). The email might be detected and stopped by
technical phishing prevention systems before it arrives in the
user’s inbox. The user receives and might open the phishing
email if the technical systems do not prevent it, which is called
the first step of the phishing process in this study. The second
step of the process is when the user clicks on the phishing link
in the email and/or opens the attachment. Clicking on the link
usually opens a phishing webpage, on which the attacker uses
various techniques to fool the user and obtain his/her sensitive
information, such as bank account details. The attachment
might contain built-in malware (e.g. ransomware, trojan, etc.)
or a fake document asking the victim to take an action
(e.g. a fake invoice, changing bank account payee details for a
payment, etc.). The third step in the phishing process is when
the user submits the sensitive information, takes the requested
action, or when the built-in malware is not detected/prevented
by any endpoint security system (e.g. antivirus software,
mobile security, so on) and the malware compromises the
1Decision-making style is defined as ‘‘the response pattern exhibited by
an individual in a decision-making situation’’ [10]
user’s device (i.e. computer, mobile phone, tablet, etc.) or
account (i.e. email account, company account, etc.). In this
study, we focused on the ‘‘clicking on the link’’ phishing
method. Future research can focus on the ‘‘opening the phish-
ing attachment’’ method, using the framework we developed
in this study.
Researchers have studied the effects of demographic fac-
tors, such as age, gender, and education on falling for
phishing [11]–[13]. However, to the best of our knowledge,
no study focused on the effects of demographic factors and
psychological traits on the phishability of users in the dif-
ferent steps of a phishing process. In the phishing process,
presented in the Figure 1, a user takes actions such as clicking
on the link and submitting the sensitive data on the phishing
website. In fact, the user makes decisions (e.g. to click or not
to click, to submit personal data or not) and takes risks (e.g.
click on the link even when the email is suspicious because
the phisher offers an ‘‘easily and quickly-achievable reward’’)
throughout the phishing process [8], [9], [14]–[16].
This paper describes a study that was performed to assess
the effects of risk-taking behaviour, decision-making style,
and demographic factors (age, gender, and education) on
how users respond to phishing attempts in the different steps
of a phishing process. Based on this research, future stud-
ies and anti-phishing solutions can tackle the root causes
of successful phishing attacks. Knowing these root causes
allows focusing efforts on how to eliminate the sources of the
phishing problem. For example, if a tendency for high-level
risk-taking can increase the probability of falling victim to
a phishing scam, we can investigate techniques to control
or reduce this attitude in high-risk people to reduce their
phishability. Of course, a risk-taking attitude can also be a
valuable asset [17]. It is therefore important to understand
which risk-taking behaviour makes people more vulnerable
to phishing. Furthermore, discriminating the effects for the
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different steps in the phishing process allows designing more
specific solutions for these different steps.
The paper is structured as follows. First is the introduc-
tion followed by a literature review. Next, the three psy-
chological tests and a phishing simulation carried out in
this study are presented. The simulation aimed to assess
the relationship between the phishability of a user and their
risk-taking behaviour and decision-making style. Finally,
the paper presents the results of the tests and simulation as
well as proposals for future studies. The paper ends with a
conclusion.
II. BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
Several studies have shown a relationship between user
behaviour,2 personality,3 and attitude4 with regard to their
cyber behaviour [21]–[27]. Some of them demonstrated the
impacts of cyber activities on a user’s behaviour [26], while
others showed the effects of an individual’s personality or
behaviour on their cyber behaviour [23], [25]. Knowing
which individual differences of Internet users might affect
their cyber security behaviour can help us to develop better
technical solutions and cyber security awareness programmes
to prevent cyber-attacks. For instance, if we find that the
risk-takers have poor cyber security behaviour, then we can
provide more and specific training to those who take more
risks. Studies have shown the relationship between indi-
vidual differences and cyber security behaviour [9], [28].
They could, for instance, demonstrate that an individual’s
rational decision-making style is associated with their device
securement behaviour [9] Alohali, et al. [29] used the
BFI model [30] to investigate the relationship between per-
sonality traits such as extraversion, agreeableness, consci-
entiousness, neuroticism and openness to experience with
28 security behaviours such as clicking on email links
and/or attachments, deleting suspicious emails, and keeping
antivirus system up-to-date. Their findings suggested that
personality traits are associated with the risk level of a user’s
security behaviour.
Other studies concentrated on phishing scams to identify
the influence of individual differences and other factors, such
as demographics, on a user’s response to phishing attempts or
phishing susceptibility [31]–[34]. While most of the studies
investigated the effects of individual differences on a user’s
responses to phishing in general, the present study concen-
trates on the effects of user’s behaviour during the different
steps of a phishing process.
According to Stuart-Kotze, ‘‘Ability and capability are not
about traits, personality or genes – they are about behaviour.
2‘‘Any action or function that can be objectively observed or measured in
response to controlled stimuli’’[18]
3‘‘The enduring configuration of characteristics and behavior that com-
prises an individual’s unique adjustment to life, including major traits, inter-
ests, drives, values, self-concept, abilities, and emotional patterns’’[19].
4‘‘A relatively enduring and general evaluation of an object, person, group,
issue, or concept on a dimension ranging from negative to positive. Attitudes
provide summary evaluations of target objects and are often assumed to be
derived from specific beliefs, emotions, and past behaviors associated with
those objects’’[20]
Unlike genetics or personality, behaviour can be described,
observed, measured and changed. As a result, both ability and
capability can be increased’’ [35]. As we mentioned above,
one of the usages of the result of this study would be to
change the behaviour of vulnerable users (i.e. behaviours that
are associated with their phishability) by using psychological
techniques such as CBT [36]. This might take a long time but
will tackle a root-cause of the person’s vulnerability. Those
behaviours may be shaped or influenced by different factors,
such as the user’s personality, attitude, emotions, thoughts,
prior cyber-victimisation experiences [37]–[39], which can
be used to change that behaviour.
A. RISK-TAKING BEHAVIOUR
Risk-taking is, in general, listed as one of the root causes
of a successful phishing attack [8], [40], [41]. Other studies
show that risk-taking is one of the causes of successful
scams [9], [14], [42], [43], so it might impact people’s
phishability. In a phishing process, the attacker usually sends
a phishing email to their targets and asks them to click on a
phishing link or download an infected file. Clicking on the
phishing link usually opens a phishing webpage asking the
user to enter sensitive personal information or to download an
infected file. For the purpose of this study, we define targets
that open the phishing email as ‘involved users’, involved
users that click on the link in the phishing e-mail ‘risky
users’, and risky users that enter their personal data on the
phishing webpage ‘high-risk users’. Accordingly, we define
phishability as the likelihood of falling into phishing traps and
becoming the victim of a phishing attack, while the level of
phishability is measured using an ordinal scale that ranges
from low to high as: involved users – risky users – high-risk
users.
As we are interested in phishability throughout the dif-
ferent steps of the phishing process, we formulate our first
hypothesis as:
H1. Users’ risk-taking behaviour affects their level of
phishability in a phishing process.
Another study found that although people who exhibit
greater financial risk-taking behaviour (i.e., risk-taking’s
financial domain) were more likely to become the target of
scams, they were not necessarily being victimised [44], [45].
As a result, it is crucial to understand whether the risk-
taking behaviour of an individual impacts their phishing
victimisation or whether it is their domain-specific risk-
taking behaviour (e.g. in the financial domain) that causes
successful phishing attacks. Although previous research did
not provide evidence that risk-taking in specific domains
influences phishability or moderates the effect of general
risk-taking behaviour on the level of phishability during the
different steps of a phishing process, some studies demon-
strated that a user’s risk-taking preferences could influence
their security behaviour [9]. Sheng, et al. [11] measured the
financial investment risk reaction of users and found that the
more risk-averse they were, the less likely they were to fall
for a phishing scam. Therefore, we formulate the following
hypothesis to confirm or refute these findings:
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FIGURE 2. Research model.
H2. Users’ domain-specific risk-taking behaviour
(e.g. financial risk-taking) will affect their level of phisha-
bility in a phishing process.
B. DECISION-MAKING STYLE
As explained in this paper and based on the other studies
mentioned [8], [45], people’s decision-making style can be
one of the factors in a successful phishing process. Sometimes
scammers put their targets in a situation where they are
more likely to make a poor decision, from the perspective
of the victim. An error in decision-making can increase the
chances of a successful scam [46]. However, a case of poor
decision-making can happen for different reasons, such as
‘‘episodic memory decline, particularly the loss of memory
for details or source’’ [47], which means that it may not be
possible to avoid people ever making a poor decision during
a phishing attack. A person’s decision-making style and their
security behaviour have been identified as some of the factors
which can affect the result of scams [9], [48]. Even when the
decision-making style is not the main cause of a successful
phishing attack, it can be one of the factors that determine
the success or failure of the attack. For instance, the target
user might decide to share sensitive, personal information
in one of the phishing steps [8], [49]–[51]. A target user
might open a phishing email and click on the link as a
result of their risk-taking behaviour but may submit their
sensitive, personal information on the phishing website due to
their decision-making style. Thus, we formulate the following
hypothesis:
H3. User’s decision-making style affects their level of
phishability in the phishing process.
C. DEMOGRAPHICS
As mentioned earlier in this paper and based on other stud-
ies [9], [11]–[13], demographic factors might influence the
phishability of users. Factors like age, gender, and education
might directly or indirectly affect how people respond to a
phishing attempt. For instance,..Sarno, et al. [52] investigated
the relationship between age (range of 18-46) and gender
differences with identifying an email as spam, authentic or
dangerous. Their finding suggested that ‘‘younger adults are
more at risk to inauthentic emails than middle-aged adults’’,
but they could not find any significant difference between
gender and identifying an email as spam.
Knowing the effects of these demographic factors on each
phishing step and how they can influence the phishability of a
user (i.e. to be an ‘‘involved user, ‘‘risky user’’, or ‘‘high-risk
user’’) can help us to build effective programmes and solu-
tions to prevent phishing during the different steps. Therefore,
we formulate the following hypothesis:
H4. Users’ demographic factors affect their level of phisha-
bility in a phishing process.
As a result of this study, we aim to have an increased under-
standing of how and to what extent a user’s behaviours impact
the success of a phishing process. This knowledge should
help mitigate a user’s phishability by helping to change their
risk-taking behaviour and/or decision-making style. Demo-
graphic factors might also affect the phishability of a user in
each step of the process, which is analysed in this study.
Figure 2 presents a high-level research model which
shows how behavioural variables (i.e. risk-taking, risk-taking
domains, and decision-making styles) and demographic fac-
tors (i.e. age, gender, and education) might influence the
phishability of a user in each step of phishing. These variables
and their hypothesized effects on the dependent variable
(user’s phishability) are explained and analysed in the next
sections.
III. RESEARCH METHOD
Cyber criminals use human cognitive and behavioural
attributes to design phishing attacks and to trick their victims
into taking the desired actions. Two such attributes were
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identified by previous studies, as risk-taking behaviour and
decision-making style [8], [9], both of which can play a role in
causing people to fall into a phishing trap. We used three psy-
chological measures in this study: the Balloon Analogue Risk
Task test (BART) [53], the Domain-Specific Risk-Taking
scale (DOSPERT) [54], and the General Decision-Making
Style scale (GDMS) [55]. We then designed and executed
a simulated phishing attack, with which we could determine
the victims phishability levels by detecting those who opened
the phishing email, those who clicked on the link provided,
and those who entered their sensitive personal data on the
phishing webpage. We analysed the effects of all the vari-
ables measured through the three psychological measures
on the level of phishability to find out how general risk-
taking behaviour, domain-specific risk-taking behaviour, and
decision-making style predict phishability.
Since the participants of this study were from different
parts of the country (Iran), and we wanted the simulation
to appear like a real-life phishing attack, we decided to run
the tests online rather than in a laboratory setting. Although
both online and in-lab methods have their advantages and
disadvantages, using the Internet is increasingly becoming a
useful method for psychological research [56]–[58]. Another
reason for doing the research online was that we did not want
the participants to know when and how they would be subject
to the simulated attack, as research has shown that inform-
ing participants that they are undertaking a phishing study
effects the result [48]. In order to improve the study’s quality,
we followed the recommendations of previous Internet-based
studies when designing and implementing our psychological
tests. For instance, we clearly explained the study on the
first page, explained each test before it started, and tested
the survey platform several times to make sure that it was
functioning correctly and was bug-free. We also tested the
psychological tests and the phishing simulation on different
Operating Systems such as Windows (XP, Vista, 7, 8, 10),
Ubuntu, Mac OS, IOS, and Android, and different Internet
browsers such as Internet Explorer, Google Chrome, and
Safari. Moreover, we piloted the tests thoroughly to make
sure that the system worked properly, that the information
provided was both clear and comprehensive.
Several legal requirements and restrictions also needed
to be taken into consideration before performing the online
phishing simulation so as not to run into any legal
issues [59], [60]. We had to design and run the simulation test
in a way that actually sent phishing emails to the participants,
we created and hosted a constructed phishing website, and we
asked study participants to submit their personal information.
As the simulation ran in Iran, we had to respect national regu-
lations; however, we were not subject to other data protection
regulations such as the EU GDPR.5 We took into considera-
tion the recommendations of previous studies in these matters
and a roadmap to carry out ethical phishing [61]–[65]. We did
5General Data Protection Regulation of the European Union;
https://gdpr.eu/
not, for instance, store any data submitted by participants
on the simulated phishing webpage, and we did not use any
trademark. The participants were requested to opt-in to the
study before it began.We also debriefed the participants about
the study and provided them with opportunities to give their
feedback.
Furthermore, the first author who played the primary role
in designing the study, performing the tests, and communicat-
ing with the participants is Iranian, so the participants were
recruited from a known culture.
A. DEMOGRAPHICS
The participants in the study were 62.2% female (84 par-
ticipants) and 37.8% male (51 participants). Age ranged
from 18 to 45 years old (three age groups of 18-25, 26-35,
36-45). All the participants were university students,
researchers, or had recently completed one level of higher-
level education and were preparing to continue their educa-
tion. 45 participants (33.3%) were in areas of study within
the social sciences, and the others 90 (66.7%) were in other
fields. Sixteen participants (11.8%) held a bachelor’s degree,
five participants (3.7%) held a master’s degree, 98 partic-
ipants were bachelor students (72.6%), twelve participants
were master students (8.9%), and four participants were PhD
students (3%). All the participants regularly used online
banking and/or online shopping.
As the participants were associated with academia (cur-
rent/future students and/or researchers), the age and educa-
tion level distributions were not balanced [66]. No one aged
over 45 participated in this study. However, as mentioned
earlier in this paper, previous studies found younger people
more vulnerable to phishing attacks [1], [11], [67]; hence the
imbalance in age distribution is not necessarily a drawback
for our study. Moreover, on average, there have been more
women than men in higher education in Iran over the last
decade [68]–[70]. This explains the unbalanced gender dis-
tribution in our sample.
B. PSYCHOMETRIC TESTS
Tomeasure the participants’ real-world risk-taking behaviour,
we used the BART test in our study. BART is widely used in
different studies to measure risk-taking behaviour of partici-
pants [17], [71]–[74]. We also used DOSPERT to measure
their risk-taking behaviour in financial, recreational, and
social domains, with which we could analyse whether it was
their overall risk-taking behaviour (based on the BART test)
which affected phishability, or whether it was risk taking in
a specific domain, for instance financial risk taking, which
influenced the phishability level of a victim.
Studies show that a victim might take several decisions
during the phishing process [8], [75], [76]. For instance,
the person decides to click on the scam link in a phish-
ing email or to close and delete the email instead. Another
example is when the person decides to share or not their
sensitive personal information with the phisher. There may
well be other personal attributes of a potential victim or
44932 VOLUME 9, 2021
H. Abroshan et al.: Phishing Happens Beyond Technology
different phishing techniques that influence the person’s
decision-making result; however, in this study, we wanted
to find out what decision-making styles can impact on the
victims’ decisions in the phishing process. For this purpose,
we used the GDMS scale, which measures the participant’s
‘‘Dependent’’, ‘‘Avoidant’’, ‘‘Intuitive’’, and ‘‘Spontaneous’’
decision-making styles.
Both the DOSPERT and GDMS scales were available in
English and in several other languages, but we could not find
a good Farsi version of the scales. As we were going to use
the scales in a new country (Iran) and translate them to a new
language, we used a forward-backward standardised transla-
tion technique [77]–[79] to translate the tests to Farsi. In this
technique, two native Iranians, both proficient in English
and with different backgrounds, translated the tests to Farsi.
They then worked together to synthesise the translations into
one common translation. In the next step of the translation
process, two other Iranian natives translated the common
translation back to English. We set up an expert committee,
including the translators and a psychologist, to review and
finalise the translations. We finally pre-tested the translated
version of the tests in a pilot phase, which is explained in this
paper. The expert committee and the first author of this paper
reviewed the translated questions based on the pilot feedback
and discussions with the pilot participants to ensure that all
the questions were clear and that they carried the same mean-
ing as the original questions. One of the pilot participants was
a native Iranian who was an English language lecturer with a
master’s degree in English language.
The DOSPERT and GDMS are well-established scales, but
since we translated the questions and the sample questions
were from another country with a different culture (the United
States), a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was conducted
on both scales. We used the following model fit indices and
their criteria to examine the goodness-of-fit of the model
with the given data set: goodness-of-fit index (GFI), compar-
ative fit index (CFI), adjusted goodness-of-fit index (AGFI),
normed fit index (NFI), Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI), and root
mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) [80], [81].
After evaluating the model fit and analysing modification
indices and standardised residual covariances, we improved
the models and used the new ones for our further analyses.
1) BALLOON ANALOGUE RISK TASK (BART)
This test measures a person’s risk-taking behaviour by exam-
ining their reward and loss potentials. In our study, the par-
ticipants had 30 balloons. For each balloon they had two
buttons on the page, ‘‘pump’’ and ‘‘collect’’. By clicking on
the pump button, the balloon was inflated and 500 IRR (Iran
Rial) were added to a counter-up until a random over-inflation
point which caused the balloon to pop and set the counter
back to zero. This meant that they could not earn any money
for that period. They could, however, at any time before the
balloon exploded have clicked on the collect button to collect
whatever they had earned so far during the period. In this test,
each click on the pump button means a greater risk-taking
behaviour and a greater potential reward. We used the most
common calculation method of BART, whereby wemeasured
each person’s risk-taking score based on the average number
of pumps on the balloons that not exploded [82].
2) DOMAIN-SPECIFIC RISK-TAKING (DOSPERT)
To test the participants’ risk-taking behaviour in different
domains, we used the DOSPERT scale. The refined ver-
sion of DOSPERT [54], [83] has 30 questions in ethical,
financial, health and safety, recreational, and social domains.
We choose eighteen questions in the financial, recreational,
and social domains as these domains were more relevant
to online scams, especially phishing attacks [14], [44],
[84]–[86]. We did not include any health and safety or ethical
questions in our study due to legal restrictions [87], [88]
and cultural differences [89]. For example, participants would
probably not have been comfortable answering questions that
included ‘‘Drinking heavily at a social function’’ as Iran is an
Islamic country where drinking alcohol is prohibited by law.
Moreover, as the tests were not anonymous and the questions
pertaining to the ethical domain were related to a person’s
unethical activities, university students would probably not
provide reliable answers because of fear of possible negative
consequences.
We asked all participants to answer the eighteen translated
questions. Each question had seven ratings which partici-
pants needed to select from: ‘‘Extremely Unlikely’’ with a
score of 1; ‘‘Moderately Unlikely’’ (score 2); ‘‘Somewhat
Unlikely’’ (score 3); ‘‘Not Sure’’ (score 4); ‘‘Somewhat
Likely’’ (score 5); ‘‘Moderately Likely’’ (score 6); and the
‘‘Extremely Likely’’ (score 7).
3) GENERAL DECISION-MAKING STYLE (GDMS)
As explained before in this paper, we decided to identify
participants’ decision-making styles to analyse their relation-
ships with their phishability. For this purpose, we used the
GDMS scale [90], which is a self-reporting questionnaire,
to identify how the participants approach situations where
they must make decisions. It includes 25 questions, such
as ‘‘my decision making requires careful thought’’, using
5-point ratings from ‘‘Strongly Disagree’’, with a score of 1,
to ‘‘Strongly Agree’’ with a score of 5. The questionnaire
identifies the following styles: ‘‘Rational’’: ‘‘thorough search
for and logical evaluation of alternatives’’; ‘‘Intuitive’’: ‘‘use
of hunches and feelings in decision making’’; ‘‘Dependent’’:
‘‘reliance on the advice of others’’; ‘‘Avoidant’’: ‘‘attempts
to avoid decision-making’’; and ‘‘Spontaneous’’: ‘‘sense of
immediacy and desire to complete decision-making as soon
as possible’’[91].
C. TEST PLATFORMS
We evaluated several online survey systems and finally
selected unipark.de for our study. We based our decision on
good reviews, user-friendliness, and the possibility to add and
use scripts. The BART test is a computerised measurement,
so we needed an online platform to run our JavaScript on.
We customised a BART script used in another study [92], and
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translated its buttons and other contents, such as ‘‘Click to
Collect the Money’’ and ‘‘Pump the Balloon’’ to Farsi.
For the phishing simulation platform, we compared several
open source and commercial systems, such as KnowBe4,6
SET,7 SPT,8 PhishMe,9 PhishingBox,10 and GoPhish,11 and
based our decision on our own selected criteria. These
included how easy it was to customise the landing page and
phishing email, whether the system supported Farsi language
and the cost. Furthermore, the emails should not end up
in participants’ spam folders and the possibility of sending
emails to public emails such as Gmail, Yahoo, etc., were also
important considerations. In the end, we chose the GoPhish
open-source phishing simulator. The technical details are
provided in Appendix A.
D. PILOT PHASE
The study was piloted with five participants in order to make
sure that all the tests were clear and comprehensive, that the
online questionnaire and phishing simulator system worked
properly, to get participants’ feedback on the content and
translation of the questions, and in general, to improve the
study and fix any possible issues. All pilot participants had
university level education (bachelor, master, or PhD level) in
social sciences or engineering and had some research experi-
ence. They were also between 35 and 48 years old. One pilot
participant was a person educated in the English language,
and another was a psychologist with a research background.
Both participants could thus help us to verify the accuracy of
the translations and the meaning of the questions. They were
informed that they would receive a financial contribution
equal to what they earned in the balloon game (BART).
The test structure:
1) The first page explained the goal of the study and what
participants should do in the next pages. We informed
them that they will play a game (BART) in which they
will earn some money that will be transferred to their
bank account afterwards. The number of questions,
which was 43, and the estimated time to complete the
tests, 20 minutes, was mentioned on this page.
2) The second page asked participants to fill in a form.
They had to enter their name and personal email
address. They were also requested to select their gen-
der, age group (18-25, 26-35, 36-45, 46-55), and level
of education (bachelor student, bachelor graduated,
master student, master graduated, PhD student) and the
subject of study. They were asked to give their consent
to sharing their personal data with the researchers of
this study and were informed that it would only be used
for the purpose of the study. They also had to give their







and steps of this research project and were informed
that their personal information would be not shared
outside of this research project. We informed them that
we would use their email address to settle the payment
(what they would earn by participating in the BART
test). We could thereby assume that they would pro-
vide a correct email address that they regularly check.
This email address could then be used in the phishing
simulation.
3) The third page was the BART test, which is described
in the Psychological Tests section of this paper. After
completing the test, they had a total amount of money
in their wallet, which was the sum of what they had
collected from each balloon that they had earned during
the game.
4) The fourth page asked them to answer the eighteen
questions of the DOSPERT test, described in the Psy-
chological Tests section of this paper.
5) The fifth page asked them to answer 25 GDMS ques-
tions, explained in the Psychological Tests section of
this paper.
6) The last page thanked them for participating and asked
them to contact us if they had any questions. A dedi-
cated email address was given on this page.
Once the five participants had completed the pilot tests,
we asked them seven questions. Based on their answers,
we found that the tests are well designed, and the questions
are easy to understand. They believed that the payment sys-
tem of the balloon game worked well and the amount of
money was enough to take the game seriously. The questions,
the reasoning behind each question, and conclusions based on
our assessment of their answers to each question are provided
in Appendix B.
E. FULL-SCALE PHASE
After completing the pilot phase, we removed all the pilot
data from the system and built a final version of the tests that
included all the fixes and improvements made as a result of
the pilot phase.
Our participants were invited to participate in our study
either via university announcements or posts on specific
social media channels12 aimed at Iranian university students
and researchers from different universities. The invitations
were announced and posted by reputable persons (e.g. pro-
fessors and known researchers) to ensure that they will be
perceived as completely trustworthy. The use of trustworthy
communication channels was meant to reduce the selection
bias towards more risk-taking individuals. The requirements
were that participants should be familiar with the use of com-
puters, email, and the web and regularly use their personal
email address. We drew attention to some rules, such as the
‘‘only one-time rule’’, whereby participants can take the test
only once. The invitation was sent to over 3,000 university
12Such as an academic researchers’ channel on Telegram and an Iranian
university students’ group on Facebook.
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students and graduates, and in total, 148 persons participated
in the study via a web link.
Every other week, we sent a thank you email to each
person who had participated in the study during that period
of time, and informed them of the amount of money that
they had earned in the balloon game. We also asked them
to send us their own bank account details (this could not
be someone else’s bank account). This helped us to ver-
ify the person’s name and to make sure that each person
participated only once and that no one could use the study
to earn more money than allowed in the framework of the
study. We sometimes received email error autoreplies (from
email servers) informing us that the email address did not
exist. One person did not reply to our email and did not
share their bank account details with us. We, however, fixed
some of the email addresses that had been entered incorrectly,
for instance, by changing username@domainname.con to
username@domainname.com. We made a spreadsheet and
documented all their responses, wrong emails, and so on.
We transferred the money that they had earned, by using
Internet banking, to their bank account and informed them
that the payment had been made. We finally cleaned the
participants’ list, for example, by removing the persons who
used the same email address and those who provided a wrong
email address. By the end of this process, we had collected
135 participants for the next phase of our study.
F. PHISHING SIMULATION
We imported the participants’ information, including their
first name, last name, and email address to the phishing
simulator (GoPhish), and created a phishing campaign. The
system sent an email to all the users, which encouraged
them to click on a link to win 100 million IR Tomans
(approximately 8,000 USD, at the time of doing the phishing
simulation). The email contained this message (in Farsi):
‘‘Dear Student/Researcher, you are invited to win 100 million
Tomans. Please click on the below link to enrol in the lottery.’’
This was followed by a link to the phishing webpage. Click-
ing on the link opened the www.100million.live webpage for
the user (our phishing webpage), which asked them to enter
their name and bank account information. Clicking on the
submit button of the webpage showed them a message that
you enrolled in the lottery. However, as we explained before
in this paper, the system did not store the information they
entered on the phishing webpage, but it only detected and
stored who opened the email, who clicked on the link, and
who pressed the button on the webpage after entering the
personal information. We assumed that they would enter their
real information as they wanted to get the money.
We continually monitored the responses and stopped the
campaign after one month, when there had been no new
records for a few days. Among those 135 participants, 97 per-
sons opened the phishing email and can thus be regarded
as ‘‘involved users’’. To identify the reason(s) why those
remaining 38 people did not open the email, we did a random
check13 after closing the campaign and found different rea-
sons such as the person did not see the email, or they
were not interested in the subject of the mail (which was
‘‘win 100 million Tomans’’ in Farsi), or they found the email
to be suspicious. However, some of them were not sure if
they had seen the email or not. We know that some of those
emails might ended-up in their spam folder or even stopped
by phishing prevention systems. This could also happen in
real life (with real phishing emails), so we considered all of
them as participants in our study, even though they had not
opened the phishing email.
IV. DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
Several analyses were performed on the data. For each step
of the phishing process, we performed: (1) a factor analysis;
(2) reliability testing; (3) multicollinearity analyses;
(4) common method variance; and (5) multiple exact logistic
regression analyses.
Table 1 summarises the demographics of the sample in
three phishing process steps. Of the 97 involved users,
22 were risky users. Of these 22 risky users, 10 were high-risk
users.
We performed a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) on
both the DOSPERT and GDMS tests. In our DOSPERT
test, we had three constructs, and we wanted to see if the
question items of each construct (i.e. risk-taking domain) load
together. We did the same for the GDMS to analyse whether
the items related to each decision-making style load together.
Answering all the scales’ questions was mandatory, so we
had no missing values, which meant that there could be no
missing items in our statistical analysis.
To explore factors that could help predict the phisha-
bility of the participants (as a result of the phishing sim-
ulation), multiple exact logistic regression analyses were
conducted with the predictor variables of risk taking (BART),
Risk-taking domains (DOSPERT), decision-making styles
(GDMS), and the outcome variable of phishability in
each step (i.e. email opened, link clicked, data submitted).
IBM SPSS
Statistics 25.0 [93] was used to analyse the data and
SAS 9.4 (SAS Inc., Cary, NC, USA) was used to carry out
exact regression models.
A. FACTOR ANALYSIS
We used AMOS 22.0 to conduct a confirmatory factor analy-
sis (CFA) on both the DOSPERT and GDMS scales. Multiple
studies considered a sample size of 100 as the minimum sam-
ple size for conducting structural equation modeling (SEM)
and CFA [94]–[97]. However, other studies [98], [99] show
that five times the number of latent variables is an acceptable
sample size for a SEM, although ten times would be better.
Our DOSPERT model had three latent variables, and the
GDMSmodel had five latent variables. Thus, our sample size
13By sending them an email from the email address which was used for
the study communications and mentioned as the contact email on the survey.
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TABLE 1. Demographic summary in three steps of phishing process.
of 135 should be enough to conduct factor analyses in this
study.
1) DOSPERT FACTOR ANALYSIS
Factor loadings of the initial CFA for the three factors of
DOSPERT scale (social, recreational, and financial) are pre-
sented in Figure 3. The model fit indices were as follows:
χ 2 = 229.04, df = 132, p<.001, GFI = 0.833,
CFI = 0.845, AGFI = 0.784, NFI = 0.707, TLI =
0.821, and RMSEA = 0.074. As it is presented in the
Table 2, F2_Q4 and F6_Q11 have weak loadings on the
financial factor. According to guidelines found in the liter-
ature, factor loadings below 0.3 should be dropped from the
model [83], [97], [100], [101]. We therefore removed those
two items from the model and the result of the model fit
changed to: χ 2 = 143.26, df = 101, p<.005, GFI = 0.883,
CFI = 0.925, AGFI = 0.843, NFI = 0.791, TLI = 0.911,
and RMSEA = 0.056. Table 2 also presents the new factor
loadings and Figure 4 presents the new model.
2) GDMS FACTOR ANALYSIS
Factor loadings of the initial CFA for the five factors of
the GDMS scale are presented in Figure 5. The model
fit indices were as follows: χ 2 = 563.98, df = 256,
p<.001, GFI = 0.730, CFI = 0.780, AGFI = 0.669,
NFI = 0.661, TLI = 0.752, and RMSEA = 0.074.
Table 3 presents the initial factor loadings. To enhance the
model fit, Standardised Residual Covariance and Modifica-
tion Indices were inspected and problematic items (e.g. those
with above 2.5 residual covariance with other items [101])
and those with loads below 0.3 were dropped from the
model [97], [100], [101]. We ended up with 20 items (three
items removed from the Intuitive, one from the Dependent,
and one from Spontaneous factors). After this enhancement,
the CFI and TLI achieved desirable values and theGFI, AGFI,
and NFI scores were close to satisfactory [102], and RMSEA
went down. The new model is presented in Figure 6, and the
model fit indices were as follows: χ 2 = 248.68, df = 158,
p<.001, GFI = 0.850, CFI = 0.922, AGFI = 0.801,
NFI = 0.817, TLI = 0.906, and RMSEA = 0.065. Table 3
presents the new factor loadings.
FIGURE 3. Initial factor model of DOSPERT.
We used the enhanced DOSPERT and GDMS models for
the next analysis in this study.
B. RELIABILITY TEST
To ensure the internal consistency of the variables, reliability
testing was performed on the subscales of DOSPERT and
GDMS. The observations for the GDMS subscales were as
follows: Cronbach’s Alpha of Intuitive = 0.711 (0.735 after
three items were deleted for model enhancement), Dependent
α = 0.777 (0.840 after one item was deleted for model
enhancement), Rational α = 0.812, Avoidant α = 0.783, and
Spontaneous α = 0.731 (0.815 after one item was deleted
for model enhancement). The observations for DOSPERT
subscales were as follows: Cronbach’s Alpha of Social =
0.547, Recreational α = 0.858, and Financial α = 0.681
(0.692 after two items were deleted for model enhancement).
The results demonstrated good internal consistency for all the
variables except for the DOSPERT’s social subscale, which
is poor but still shows moderate reliability [103].
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TABLE 2. The initial and new factor loadings of the DOSPERT scale.
TABLE 3. The initial and new factor loadings of the GDMS scale.
C. MULRICOLLINEARITY ANALYSES
We performed a Pearson correlation analysis and examined
the Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) on all the predictor vari-
ables to detect a possible issue of multicollinearity in our
study [104]. The results indicated that no multicollinearity
problem within the regression models (Maximum VIF in all
the phishing steps and models is below 4 [105]). The tests
results can be found in Appendix D.
D. COMMON METHOD VARIANCE
To examine the potential impact of common method bias,
we conducted Harman’s single-factor test on both the
DOSPERT and GDMS models [106]. The single-factor test
on the DOSPERT indicated that 23.6% of the variance was
explained by one item, and the test on the GDMS indicated
that 24.0% of the variance was explained by one item. These
results showed that no single factor accounted for most of
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FIGURE 4. Improved factor model of DOSPERT.
FIGURE 5. Initial factor model of GDMS.
the variance in the variables of the DOSPERT and GDMS
models [106], [107].
FIGURE 6. Improved factor model of GDMS.
E. EXACT LOGISTIC REGRESSIONS
Our dichotomous dependent variable in each step (i.e.
involved users, risky users, and high-risk users), needs the use
of logistic regression. We used multiple exact logistic regres-
sion in this study, as it is the appropriate method for small
and unbalanced samples [108]. The predictive power of each
of the risk-taking behaviours, decision-making styles, and
demographic factors are shown in Table 4, which presents the
results from several exact logistic regressions (coefficients
with odds ratios in parentheses). The results show that the
measures are not significant predictors of opening the phish-
ing email and submitting data (i.e. involved users in the first
step and high-risk users in the third step of the phishing
process). However, the risk-taking behaviour (BART) (β =
0.074, p < 0.05) and gender (β = 1.267, p < 0.05)
do significantly predict clicking on the phishing link (risky
users) in the second step of the phishing process.
These results support our H1, as users’ risk-taking
behaviour influenced their level of phishability in a phish-
ing process. More specifically, the results show that general
risk-taking behaviour increases the likelihood to become a
risky user (i.e. clicking the link, which happens in the second
step of the phishing process). The results show no effect of
risk-taking in recreational, social and financial domains on
the level of phishability, hence H2 is not supported. Likewise,
there is no support for H3 as we did not find an effect of
decision-making style on the level of phishability. We also
did not find any association between age and education
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TABLE 4. Results from the exact logistic regressions predicting users’ responses to each phishing step.
factors and level of phishability, but the results show an effect
of gender on clicking on the phishing link, which provides
support for H4 as far as gender is concerned.
V. DISCUSSION
The findings from this study show that users’ response to
a phishing attack can be influenced by their risk-taking
behaviour.We also found that gender is a predictor of clicking
on a phishing link. Specifically related to the aim of our
study, these effects occur in the second step of the phish-
ing process, so general risk-taking behaviour and gender
influence the likelihood of involved users to become risky
users. Figure 7 shows a high-level summary of our findings.
These results suggest that the risk-taking behaviour of
the users could affect their phishability level in the second
step of the phishing process. There was no evidence of a
satisfactory significant effect of risk-taking behaviours and
decision-making styles on opening a phishing email, clicking
on a phishing link in the email, and submitting sensitive data
on a phishing website.
Moreover, our findings show that women can be slightly
more phishable than men in the second step of the phishing
process. This, however, could demonstrate that there might
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FIGURE 7. Effects of behaviors and demographic factors on each phishing step.
be other psychological reasons, for instance, gender-specific
behaviours [109], [110], that might indirectly or directly
impact the level of phishability. Further work is needed to
learn more about the possible effects of female-related traits
or behaviours on their level of phishability.
The aim of this studywas to identify the effect of behaviour
during the different steps of a phishing attack. We assessed
some possible psychological root causes of what can make
a phishing scam successful when a user receives a phish-
ing email. Opening these emails is usually safe, especially
if we view the email in plain text or HTML mode, but it
might infect our computer if our email client allows script-
ing [111]. Furthermore, attackers might spoof an email to
send email appearing to be from someone else. Although
organisations and Internet/email service providers can reduce
the email account spoofing risks by using solutions such as
Sender Policy Framework (SPF), Domain Keys Identified
Mail (DKIM), and Domain-based Message Authentication,
Reporting and Conformance (DMARC) [112], but according
to the technical report [113] of the Joint Research Centre
(JRC), many users do not follow anti-spoofing standards and
solutions. Employees in an organisation may open an email
from known names, e.g. their manager or the CEO. Our study
did not show any effect of risk-taking behaviour and decision-
making style on opening a phishing email, but there might be
other reasons such as an attractive email subject that uses the
Visceral Influence tactic [8], [114], an email from a known
person (spoofed email), or a sense of urgency in the user
which might lead an individual to open the email. One of
the main issues with opening such emails is that the scammer
might use email tracking techniques [115] which makes them
sure that the email address belongs to a real person. In this
case, the scammer will probably focus on the victim and use
different tactics, for example, by using sophisticated spear
phishing techniques [8], [116]–[121], to successfully attack
that person. Focusing on deploying technical phishing email
detection and prevention solutions [122] is therefore con-
sidered favourable to prevent phishing emails from reaching
users in the first place.
A phishing message is designed to look genuine, usu-
ally using the same format as that of the real organisation,
including their logo. Scammers use different techniques to
convince the user to open an infected attachment or click
on a link [8], [123]. Opening the attachment might infect
the user’s computer, and then an organisation’s servers for
example, with a malware such as ransomware [124], [125].
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Clicking on the link and opening the phishing website can
cause several problems, such as infecting the user’s computer
with a malware [124], attracting the user to submit sensitive
information on the website, downloading an infected file
from a website or cloud file hosting service (e.g. Dropbox).
This study shows that a user who takes more risks will most
likely click on a phishing link. Previous researches [9], [126]
have shown a relationship between risk-taking and people’s
responses to cyber-attacks in general and phishing. However,
knowing that the general risk-taking attitude of the user, and
not necessarily a specific risk-taking attitude, has a stronger
effect in one step of a phishing attack (i.e. based on this
study, clicking on the link in step 2) can help us to develop
successful mitigation strategies and solutions, especially for
the risk takers. For example, it is possible to measure the
risk-taking style of an organisation’s employees and deliver
focused trainings to employees with a high risk-taking score
(e.g. to increase their awareness and knowledge about the
dangers linked with clicking on links) and/or to implement
an adequate technical solution [127]–[130]. Another way
to reduce a users’ likelihood of clicking on phishing links
can be to use psychotherapy techniques to reduce negative
risk-taking [17], [131]. This could be deliverable through
Internet-based psychotherapies such Internet-based Cogni-
tive Behavioural Therapy (iCBT) [36], [132], [133].
We however did find that gender is a significant (but not
strong) unique predictor in step 2 of the phishing process, i.e.
clicking on the link. Multiple studies have also showed that
gender can affect a user’s cybersecurity behaviour, such as
avoiding reusing passwords for different accounts, proactive
awareness (such as paying attention to indicators in a website
or email), applying security patches [9], and falling prey to a
phishing scam [1], [11]. A previous study [11] suggested that
gender had effects on falling prey to a phishing attack and
showed that women were more likely to click on phishing
links than men. The study [11] showed that gender can have
an indirect effect on falling prey to a phishing attack, as a
result of a lack of technical knowledge and a lack of training
of users. We believe that further work is needed to shed
some light on other indirect effects of gender on each step
of the process of a phishing attack, especially in clicking on
phishing links, as we found a significant effect in this step.
However, these indirect effects may be inconsistent in other
countries, male and female traits and behaviours differ across
cultures [110]. Thus, it is possible that users’ behaviours in
clicking on phishing links are subject to cultural differences.
Many phishing emails contain a hyperlink to a phishing
website. The link looks like a legitimate hyperlink, but it is,
in fact, a disguised link to a criminal website, which could
install a malware on the victims’ device or steal the individ-
ual’s sensitive and confidential data [134], [135]. In this study,
we measured the effects of risk-taking, decision-making,
and demographics (age, gender, and level of education) on
submitting information on a phishing website, which can
compromise the victim’s bank account, access to personal or
organisational confidential data, so on and so forth. We could
not find any significant effect of the mentioned psychological
behaviours related to risk and decision-making on submitting
information on the phishing website.
There were, however, several limitations in our study.
We conducted the tests in a real-world setting to increase
the appeared veracity of the phishing simulation. We tried
to control some of the real-world experimental limitations
such as by providing an incentive to participants (the BART
reward). The possible effects of not having an incentive to
provide feedback or continue completing a test have been
mentioned in a previous study [136]. However, this incentive
caused some issues and limitations, such as:
• We are not sure whether the reason that some partici-
pants did not open the email was that they did not want
to take the risk or because they did not see the email, etc.
• We are not aware of any extraneous variables for each
participant and could, therefore, not control and min-
imise those effects. For instance, the impact of a stressful
situation or the mood of a participant was not consid-
ered. Such variables could affect the results of our tests,
especially in the phishing simulation.
• We had to end the simulation as soon as possible; other-
wise, our website could be listed in phishing databases
and/or filtered by phishing prevention systems. This
meant that the duration of the exercise was limited.
• We do not know if a participant had a client issue
(e.g. browser issues, high security protections if they
were connected to a secure network or used email/client
anti-phishing features), which could prevent users from
taking action in the simulated phishing.
Having no control over the participants’ environments gave
us little visibility on other factors that could influence clicking
or not clicking on the phishing link. We believe this to be an
intrinsic limitation of online studies.
Moreover, only one type of phishing attack (i.e., lottery
scam) was used in this study. Participants might respond dif-
ferently to other types of phishing attacks. Future studies can
investigate the effects of users’ behaviour and demographics
for other types of phishing.
Another limitation of our study was the number of par-
ticipants, as our overall response rate was only 5%. How-
ever, a low response rate to online studies shown by
researchers [137], [138].
Finally, we could not include all the questions of the
DOSPERT scale due to some limitations in Iran [87], [88]
and cultural differences [89]. This meant that we could not
measure the effect of all risk-taking attitudes on the phishing
process. In addition to that, our participants were university
students, researchers, and those who were preparing to con-
tinue their education, meaning that the sample is not repre-
sentative of the overall Internet population.
All in all, the results of this study did not show any effect
of risk-taking domains and decision-making style on all three
steps of the phishing process. Therefore, we might be able
to assume that a user will not necessarily be deemed phish-
able because, for example, their financial risk-taking is high
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TABLE 5. Questions asked after the pilot tests.
(at least in a similar phishing process as used in this study).
High risk-taking behaviour can lead users to click on a phish-
ing email, but not their risk-taking in a specific domain,
as measured by the DOSPERT scale. The same result was
found for the decision-making style of users (opening a phish-
ing email, clicking on a phishing link, and submitting data in a
phishing website), is unlikely to be related to a user’s rational
decision-making skills.
In this study, we have developed a unique method-
ology to find associations between human behaviours
(i.e. risk-taking and decision-making in this study) and the
phishability of users. This methodology can be used to inves-
tigate the effects of other human behaviours on phishability
by using different psychological scales (to measure those
behaviours).
VI. CONCLUSION
In this study, we analysed the effects of risk-taking, decision-
making, age, gender, and the level of education on the suc-
cess of a phishing attack. Phishing is usually a process in
which scammers try to gain a victim’s trust and encourage
them to open a phishing email, click on a link (or open
an infected attachment) and finally share sensitive informa-
tion on a phishing website, such as bank account details
or confidential information about their organisation. If we
understand the main reasons why people follow the attacker
in each phishing step, this will help us to make an effective
programme to block phishing attacks each step of the way.
These programmes can work alongside existing technical
solutions to increase the level of phishing prevention both
in our private and public lives. We analysed the effect of
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TABLE 6. Correlations in the first phishing step (email opened).
TABLE 7. Correlations in the second phishing step (link clicked).
some personal behaviours and demographic factors in each
of the three phishing steps described. Future studies can use a
similar model to identify the effect of other possible phishing
root causes (i.e. human and psychological factors), which can
help us to build a holistic framework to proactively prevent
the success of phishing scams.
We found that a high level of general risk-taking can
increase the possibility of clicking on a phishing link, and
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TABLE 8. Correlations in the third phishing step (data submitted).
that women seem to be more prone to clicking on a phish-
ing link. We realise, however, that these findings can vary
across cultures and countries. Future research could focus
on gender-specific behaviours and other psychological rea-
sons that might indirectly or directly impact the level of
phishability.
The strength of this study is that it was conducted in a man-
ner that reflects what happens in the real world. Furthermore,
it analysed two types of human behaviour, when it comes
to risk-taking and decision-making. These two predictors of
user behaviour form a basis for future research with the aim
of finding a holistic approach to tackling phishing attacks.
The findings described in this paper have implications for
security management in organisations. For example, assess-
ing the risk-taking behaviour of an organisation’s employees
and adapting company policy to include specific security and
anti-phishing training opportunities (especially for risky users
and high-risk users, for example) are twoways to help prevent
successful phishing attacks and the dangers that they incur
both for a user and their employer.
Moreover, the methodology we developed in this study can
be used to investigate relationships between different human
behaviours and phishability.
APPENDIX A
PHISHING SIMULATOR TECHNICAL DETAILS
We installed and configured the GoPhish system on a
Windows 2016 Virtual Private Server (VPS) hosted by
time4vps.com. The server had a 2.60 GHz CPU, with 2 GB
RAM, 20GB storage and 2 TB bandwidth permonth.We then
registered the 100million.live domain name for one year and
created the win@100million.live email address. The domain
name was registered in private mode, so that in case the par-
ticipants searched the domain in a ‘‘Whois’’ online service,
they would not be able to find our names as the domain own-
ers, which could make it suspicious to the participants and
compromise our results. We also created a phishing webpage
which asked visitors to enter their full name and bank card
number in order to enrol in a 100,000,000 IRT (Iran Toman,
which is equal to one billion IRR) lottery. The webpage was
hosted on the VPS mentioned above, and its IP address regis-
tered as the www hostname in the DNS of the 100million.live
domain name, so that the www.100million.live URL opened
the phishing webpage. We tested the URL from different
places in Iran to make sure that it was accessible from differ-
ent Internet Service Providers, including mobile operators.
We had to ensure that the domain name and IP
address would not be blacklisted as a phishing IP or
domain [8], [139], [140] or be blocked by web filtering
and other security systems. We also had to make sure that
the simulated phishing emails would not be blocked by
anti-spam and anti-phishing software. For this purpose,
the phishing webpage was hosted by GoPhish and was only
available during the period where we were running the phish-
ing simulation. It was, therefore, only available for a short
period of time, which decreased the chance of it being black-
listed [141], [142]. We also used techniques such as using a
Meta Robots tag [143] to hide the webpage from web search
engines. We also used Search Engine Optimisation (SEO)
techniques [144] to make the page unsearchable and thus
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TABLE 9. Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) in three phishing steps.
prevent it from being indexed by search engines, which would







A. DOSPERT SURVEY INSTRUMENT
S1-Q1 Admitting that your tastes are different from
those of a friend.
S2-Q5 Disagreeing with an authority figure on a
major issue.
14BART’s JavaScript
S3-Q13 Choosing a career that you truly enjoy over a
more secure one.
S4-Q14 Speaking your mind about an unpopular issue
in a meeting at work.
S5-Q17 Moving to a city far away from your extended
family.
S6-Q18 Starting a new career in your mid-thirties.
R1-Q2 Going camping in the wilderness.
R2-Q7 Going down a ski run that is beyond your
ability.
R3-Q9 Going whitewater rafting at high water in the
spring.
R4-Q12 Taking a skydiving class.
R5-Q15 Bungee jumping off a tall bridge.
R6-Q16 Piloting a small plane.
F1-Q3 Betting a day’s income at the horse races.
F2-Q4 Investing 10% of your annual income in a
moderate growth mutual fund.
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F3-Q6 Betting a day’s income at a high-stake poker
game.
F4-Q8 Investing 5% of your annual income in a very
speculative stock.
F5-Q10 Betting a day’s income on the outcome of a
sporting event.
F6-Q11 Investing 10%of your annual income in a new
business venture.
B. GDMS SURVEY INSTRUMENT
I1_Q1 When I make decisions, I tend to rely on my
intuition.
I2_Q3 I rarely make important decisions without
consulting other people.
I3_Q12 When I make a decision, it is more important
for me to feel the decision is right than to have
a rational reason for it.
I4_Q16 I double-check my information sources to be
sure I have the right facts before making deci-
sions.
I5_Q17 I use the advice of other people in making my
important decisions.
D1_Q2 I put off making decisions because thinking
about them makes me uneasy.
D2_Q5 I make decisions in a logical and systematic
way.
D3_Q10 When making decisions I do what feels natu-
ral at the moment.
D4_Q18 I generally make snap decisions.
D5_Q22 I like to have someone steer me in the right
direction when I am faced with important
decisions.
R1_Q4 My decision making requires careful thought.
R2_Q7 When making a decision, I trust my inner
feelings and reactions.
R3_Q11 When making a decision, I consider various
options in terms of a specified goal.
R4_Q13 I avoid making important decisions until the
pressure is on.
R5_Q25 I often make impulsive decisions.
A1_Q6 When making decisions, I rely upon my
instincts.
A2_Q14 I generally make decisions that feel right to
me.
A3_Q19 I often need the assistance of other people
when making important decisions.
A4_Q21 I postpone decision making whenever possi-
ble.
A5_Q23 I often make decisions on the spur of the
moment.
S1_Q8 I often put off making important decisions.
S2_Q9 If I have the support of others, it is easier for
me to make important decisions.
S3_Q15 I generally make important decisions at the
last minute.
S4_Q20 I make quick decisions.




Correlations in the phishing process steps, Variance Inflation
Factors (VIF) examination. See Table 6–9.
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